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 Over the past decades, proper micro-
foundations have been a basic requirement
within macroeconomic research. The model
should be based on optimizing behaviour.
While most economists would acknowledge
that in the real world, human beings often
make errors and behave irrationally, it has
been a common view that incorporating such
behaviour in economic theories would not be
a fruitful approach. Irrationality and errors
have often been thought to be unsystematic
and unpredictable. Moreover, there has been
a concern that if one were to allow deviations
from the common behavioural assumptions 
– the economic man, motivated by self-
interest and capable of rational decision-
making – it might end up in a situation where
researchers introduce the form of irrational
behaviour that they found appropriate in each
specific case. Then one would be able “to
explain anything”, but without really ex-
plaining anything at all, because all the
explanations would hinge on ad hoc
behavioural assumptions. 
This view, however, has been challenged
by an increasing body of research showing that
the deviations of human behaviour from the
economic man assumption are not unsyste-
matic and unpredictable. Rather, research by
cognitive psychologists and experimental
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features related to the thinking and decision-
making of human beings where they differ
systematically from the economic man. Thus,
building economic theories based on well-
documented aspects of human behaviour
should no longer be criticized for being ad 
hoc.
In this paper I shall provide a short
overview of important deviations from the
economic man assumption that have been
documented in this line of research. The
overview will not do justice to the complexity
of the field; rather, I shall categorize and
simplify. Interested readers would be well
advised to go further in the study of this highly
interesting field. After the overview, I proceed
to look at one specific topic within macro-
economics – the short run aggregate supply
schedule – and discuss whether theories based
on behavioural assumptions might perhaps
resolve weaknesses in the more traditional
approach.
The rest of the paper is organised as
follows. In section 2, I provide a brief overview
of important deviations from the economic
man assumption that have been established in
research by cognitive psychologists and
experimental economists. Section 3 proceeds
to discuss a specific application, referred to as
the aggregate supply puzzle. Section 4
concludes.
Behavioural deviations from the
economic man assumption
1
Most deviations from the economic man
assumption can be grouped in one of three
categories, depending on whether they relate
to preferences, biases in judgment, or to the
notion that human behaviour can be seen as
the result of maximisation of a stable
preference function. 
Preferences that deviate from the 
economic man assumption
Traditionally, economic models have been
based on the self-interest hypothesis that
assumes that human beings are only motivated
by their material self-interest. A large body of
research has documented a number of
systematic deviations from this.
Social preferences imply that agents’ utility
also depends on how much other players
receive. This may take several different forms
•  altruism (utility is increasing in the well-
being of others)
•  relative income and envy (utility is in-
creasing in the income relative to others)
• inequity aversion (agents dislike in-
equality, even if favourable to themselves)
Intention-based reciprocity implies that
agents care about the intentions of other
players, and not only the distributional
consequences. Thus, agents often 
•  return “good with good” (e.g. they
cooperate if others cooperate), and they
•  return “bad with bad” – experiments show
that many agents are willing to take
revenge on what they view as unfair
behaviour, even if it is costly to themselves
Social preferences and reciprocity can be
viewed as two related types of concerns for
fairness. Human beings do care about
whether a situation is fair, both when it comes
to the outcome and the process, and this may
affect their behaviour in important ways. 
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agents’ utility depend not only on the current
situation, but also on the current situation
relative to a reference level, often given by
recent history. The two main forms are
•  loss aversion: people are more averse to
losses relative to their reference level than
they are attracted to the same-sized gains
•  diminishing sensitivity: the marginal
change in perceived well-being is greater
for changes that are close to reference level
Loss aversion is a key part of prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and gives rise
to the endowment effect, which describes the
feature that once a person possesses a good,
he values it more. 
Several of the features above have been
fruitfully explored in recent macroeconomic
research. Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) show
that if utility functions exhibit the “catching
up with the Joneses” – feature, so that if others
consume more today, our representative 
consumer will experience a higher margi-
nal utility from an additional unit of
consumption in the future, optimal tax policy
is pro-cyclical. The idea is that in booms
caused by a positive productivity shock,
consumption will be higher than the socially
efficient level (the economy is “overheated”),
as consumers do not take into account the
negative externality on others. Thus, in
booms, taxes should be raised to dampen the
“overheating” of the economy. Fuhrer (2000)
shows that including habit formation, in the
sense of consumers’ utility depending in part
on current consumption relative to past
consumption, improves the empirical
relevance of standard models for monetary
policy.
The effects listed above all clearly deviate
from the common assumptions within
economics. However, it is less clear that one
should view them as irrational. First, one can
argue that preferences cannot be irrational –
rationality should involve optimization for
given preferences, but the preferences them-
selves should be above scrutiny. 
A second argument against viewing the
effects above as irrational is that some of them
may in fact be rather helpful to the individual.
Reciprocity is a case in point; the fact that an
agent may take revenge even if it is costly for
him to do so, may prevent other agents from
taking actions that harm the former agent in
the first place. Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger
(1997) provide experimental evidence that
reciprocity may contribute to the enforcement
of contracts and thus improve gains from
trade. On the other hand, in other situations,
preferences as described above may lead to
behaviour that is disadvantageous to the
individual that undertakes it.
Biases in judgment
In the standard approach, agents treat
information in a rational manner. Infor-
mation may be imperfect, perhaps because it
is costly to obtain, but the information that is
available is treated in an optimal way. Yet a lot
of research documents how agents often take
a heuristic approach to complex situations,
where they simplify so that the situation is
easier to grasp. In most cases, this is rather
useful, but occasionally it involves systematic
and severe errors. There are several related
types of errors.
•  “law of small numbers”. Many studies
have shown that people have a strong
tendency to view a small sample as much
more representative of the underlying
population than what is reasonable. In
other words, people will over-infer from a
short sequence of observations. 
•  memorable evidence overweighed – when
there are several pieces of information,
partly conflicting, agents have a tendency
Behavioural macroeconomics and the aggregate supply puzzle 29
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more memorable and salient.
•  “base-rate neglect” – agents neglect prior
information about the underlying
distribution, and give too much credence
to random observations
Other research has documented the existence
of a confirmatory bias, referring to the feature
that when people have formed a hypothesis,
they are reluctant to give it up. Subsequent
evidence is viewed in light of the existing
beliefs, and often interpreted as supporting
the existing beliefs. Strikingly, experiments
have shown that in situations where two
groups have been given different information,
and thus have different opinions, when they
are given new evidence, both groups interpret
the new evidence as strengthening their own
opinion.
A further important deviation from the
rational treatment of information is the
framing effect – that two logically equivalent
statements of a problem lead decision-makers
to choose different options. This feature is
well-known to marketing personnel – it is not
a coincidence that firms give discounts to
some age groups, as retirees, children,
students, etc, rather than charge an additional
fee for the other age groups.
Do agents maximise a stable preference function?
Other research shows a number of features
that are inconsistent with the view that agents
maximise a stable preference function.
•  hyperbolic discounting – In the tradi-
tional approach, individuals discount at a
constant rate, so that the difference
between today and tomorrow is pro-
portionally the same as the difference
between one year, and one year and one
day. Yet studies show, not surprisingly, that
individuals are much less patient in their
choice between today and tomorrow than
when it comes to choices advanced further
in the future.
•  “isolation error” – agents view choices as
separate events, without taking into
consideration the effect on the overall
outcome. One consequence is that agents
are averse to small-scale risk, even if the
risk as to the total wealth is negligible.
•  transition rule – the immediate effect of a
change is viewed as a reliable indicator of
the permanent impact. Thus, agents
underestimate the effect of adaptation.
•  choice under uncertainty. Agents do not
evaluate uncertain projects in an
appropriate statistical manner. Very low
probability events are often neglected, low
probability events are overweighted, while
high-probability events are under-
weighted.
•  Endogenous preferences – in many
situations, the preferences of the people
concerned are affected in surprising ways.
For example, studies show that paying
people for a task that they might willingly
do, might reduce their motivation for the
task. Specifically, among individuals
strongly motivated to donate blood, an
offer of financial reward has been shown
to reduce the likelihood that they actually
donate blood.
Discussion 
How important are these deviations from the
rational man approach? This is a question
where research is still lagging behind, even if
some advances have been done (see Akerlof,
2002, for an overview). One topic which has
received considerable attention recently is
hyperbolic discounting, which seems to be
key to understanding the saving behaviour of
many households. Laibson, Repetto, and
Tobacman (2003) argue that consumers
appear to be of two minds; their large,
30 Steinar Holden
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accumulations are consistent with a discount
rate of 5 percent, while their frequent credit
card borrowing is consistent with a discount
rate of 18 percent. 
Taken to the extreme, hyperbolic
discounting implies that agents are unable to
undertake costly actions today, even if the
future gain greatly exceeds the immediate
costs. In such cases, one approach taken in
some research is to explicitly distinguish
between the utility function that individuals
maximize (which thus determines their
actions) and the utility function that
represents their “true welfare”. Hyperbolic
discounting thus gives a rationale for institu-
tional mechanisms that facilitate commitment
to a saving behaviour more consistent with
individuals “true welfare”, e.g.
•  tax policies subsidizing saving through
pensions and penalizing early withdrawals
•  legal constraints on credit markets, and on
using future labour income as collateral,
so as to prevent or reduce over-
consumption.
Another topic that has received considerable
attention is fairness, in particular in relation
to nominal wage rigidity. Considerable survey
evidence document that both managers and
workers view nominal wage cuts as unfair,
even if the same real wage outcome realised
through price increases at constant nominal
wages would be viewed as fair. Akerlof,
Dickens and Perry (1996) show how such
fairness considerations may lead to excess
unemployment at low rates of inflation, where
changes in relative wages require nominal
reduction of wages in some firms.
A common argument among proponents
of the economic man assumption is that
agents learn from their errors, so that their
behaviour over time becomes closer to that
predicted by the economic man assumption.
This feature is documented in a recent study
of sportscards transactions (List, 2004), where
it is shown that inexperienced consumers’
exhibit the endowment effect predicted by
prospect theory, while consumers with intense
market experience behave largely in
accordance with neoclassical predictions (i.e.
the economic man assumption). While it
seems clear that agents with massive
experience do a large part of the transactions
undertaken in the economy, one should also
note that many important decisions, like
buying a house and changing workplace, are
taken by agents that don’t make these
decisions frequently. In a study of the Boston
housing market, Genesove and Mayer (2001)
show that potential sellers who were facing a
considerable loss, asked for higher prices than
otherwise identical sellers who had bought at
a lower price, i.e. consistent with the loss
aversion hypothesis. Asking for higher prices
led to higher prices for the houses that were
sold, but also reduced the likelihood that a
house was actually sold. Furthermore, there is
also considerable documentation that in many
cases even the behaviour of “professionals”
deviate from the standard economic man
assumptions, see e.g. Schleifer (2000).
The aggregate supply puzzle
The last decade there has been considerable
research on an unsolved puzzle in macro-
economics, namely that the standard
theoretical model of aggregate supply is
inconsistent with evidence. In this section I
shall briefly explain the problem, then I
discuss various attempts to solve it.
The standard aggregate supply schedule,
used in many textbooks and in much
macroeconomic research, is based on the
forward-looking overlapping contract models
of Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983). In the
Taylor model, firms are divided into two
Behavioural macroeconomics and the aggregate supply puzzle 31
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two periods. Wage setting is staggered, so that
group 1 set wages in odd periods, and group
2 in even periods. xt denotes the log wage set
in period t. When wages are set in period t,
wage setters relate their wage to the wage set
by the other group in the previous period
(which is still in effect in period t), and to the
wage they expect the other group to set in the
next period, Etxt+1. In addition, wage setting
depends on the activity level of the economy,
so that in periods with a positive output gap,
i.e. log output yt above the natural level y*,
wages are higher than they would otherwise
have been. 
(1)   xt = 
1/2 (xt-1 + Etxt+1) + γ(yt – y*)  γ > 0
Firms set prices as a markup over marginal
costs, assumed to be equal to wages (assuming
constant returns to scale with labour as the
only input). Thus, the aggregate price level in
period t is equal to the average wage level in
period t, i.e. the average of the wage set in the
previous and the current period (plus a
constant markup neglected for simplicity)
(2)   pt = 
1/2 (xt + xt-1).
Defining the rate of inflation as πt = pt – pt-1,
straightforward manipulation of (1) and (2)
gives us
(3)   πt = Etπt+1 + γ(yt + yt-1 – 2y*).
Equation (3) looks like a standard Phillips-
curve, well-known from a lot of empirical
research, where inflation depends on expected
inflation and the output gap (the latter
captures the effect of unemployment, as a
positive output gap is associated with low
unemployment, and thus involves higher
inflation). However, it is nevertheless
inconsistent with evidence on several
important aspects. 
First, while (3) can explain that data
exhibits autocorrelation in inflation, as this
follows immediately from autocorrelation in
the driving variable output yt, there is no direct
effect of πt-1 in (3). The absence of the lagged
inflation term in (3) implies that there is no
persistence in inflation except for the effect
via output; inconsistent with evidence as
shown by Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Rudd
and Whelan (2003).
Secondly, and more strikingly, (3) implies
that inflation is expected to go down in 
a boom – according to (3) it is when 
yt – y* > 0, that πt > Etπt+1. This feature is
inconsistent with evidence supporting the
NAIRU, that inflation increases when output
is high relative to the natural level (and un-
employment correspondingly low). This is the
main point of Ball (1994), who shows that
the standard aggregate supply model as given
by (3) implies that a credible disinflation
should involve a boom, yet he provides
evidence that disinflations usually are
associated with a recession.
Thirdly, and perhaps more profoundly, (3)
is inconsistent with the idea that the effect of
contractionary monetary policy is a reduction
in output, and a delayed negative effect on
inflation (Mankiw, 2001). While one might
argue that Ball’s evidence could be put aside
based on the notion that the disinflations
where not credible, Mankiw emphasises that
when the monetary contraction is already
undertaken – the interest rate is increased –
credibility is no longer an issue. Given that
the most observers expect an interest rate hike
to lead to lower inflation, we must have 
Etπt+1< πt, thus the effect on output according
to (3) should positive. Yet a positive output
effect of an interest rate increase is the opposite
of what most economists and central bankers
think.
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schedule, though theoretically appealing, is
inconsistent with much evidence and also with
how economists and practitioners view the
economy. How should one proceed to reconcile
theory and evidence? Many different solutions
have been proposed. One obvious solution is
to return to the idea of adaptive expectations –
replacing Etπt+1 with lagged inflation in (3)
solves most of the inconsistencies with
evidence. However, adaptive expectations in its
most primitive form – where agents make
systematic errors without thinking – is not very
attractive from a theoretical point of view.
Furthermore, as documented by Ball (2000),
the hypothesis that inflation is persistent
because agents always expect it to be persistent
is not consistent with evidence from the Gold
standard period, when US inflation was not
persistent. 
Another possibility is a hybrid model,
where some agents are forward-looking and
other agents are backward-looking (Gali &
Gertler, 1999). While this model clearly has
attractive elements, it has also been heavily
criticised as being inconsistent with evidence;
specifically, the forward-looking part is said
to be empirically invalid (Rudd & Whelan,
2003; see a response by Gali et al, 2003;
Bårdsen et al, 2002).
A third possible explanation is based on a
variation of the preferences of the agents
(Fuhrer and Moore, 1995). However, as
shown by Holden and Driscoll (2003), this
approach has dubious micro foundations, as
it requires that agents care about the wage
others had in the past.
The limited success of the more standard
approaches has led to a number of suggestions
based on behavioural models. Several of these
approaches emphasise the limits to the
information that is available to the agents, and
the limits to the ways they use this infor-
mation.
Ball (2000) suggests a model where agents
use univariate forecasts, i.e. agents’ forecasts
are based solely on lagged inflation behaviour.
In contrast to the standard adaptive
expectations assumption, this model allows
agents’ forecasts to depend on the stochastic
properties of the variable. In time periods
when inflation has not been persistent (as
during the Gold standard), agents do not
predict it to be persistent in the future. On
the other hand, in the post-war period when
inflation was persistent, agents expected it to
continue being so. Thus, this approach has
the virtue that it explains data for both time
periods. However, while Ball provides
important new light on the inflation per-
sistence problem by bringing attention to
inflation behaviour in the Gold standard
period, a problem with his approach is the
failure to explain why agents should neglect
other information than past inflation
behaviour.
Another proposal is the “Sticky in-
formation” approach by Mankiw and Reis
(2002), based on the assumption that agents
update their information at intervals. This is a
simple and attractive model that captures the
notion that agents do not take all information
into account immediately. However, this
model also involves problematic assumptions.
Most importantly, perhaps, the consistency of
the theoretical model with empirical evidence
is based on the highly problematic assumption
that firms change prices without updating
information – an assumption inconsistent
with a lot of evidence on the pricing behaviour
of firms.
A third approach, suggested by Woodford
(2003) and Amato and Shin (2003), is based
on the idea that there are limits to agents’
ability of absorbing information. In these
papers it is shown theoretically that noisy
subjective perceptions by individual agents
lead to greater uncertainty about higher-order
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to expect about his expectations concerning
their expectations, etc). One consequence of
this feature is that inflation may be highly
persistent. While this approach seems very
promising, the models used so far are rather
complex, and it is thus difficult to evaluate to
what extent they succeed in providing a
satisfactory theoretical framework for the
available evidence.  
A fourth approach, suggested by Driscoll
and Holden (2003), is that inflation
persistence is a consequence of coordination
problems under multiple equilibria.
Following Bhaskar (1990), Driscoll and
Holden assume that workers are concerned
about fair treatment, in the sense that they
care disproportionately more about being paid
less than other workers than they do about
being paid more than other workers. When
incorporated into a standard wage bargaining
model, the fair treatment assumption causes a
continuum of rational expectations equilibria,
in the form of a range of wage growth rates
for which each wage setter will aim for the
same wage growth as set by the others. 
Driscoll and Holden argue that wage
setters’ past behaviour may work as an
equilibrium selection device: among all the
actions consistent with a possible equilibrium,
agents expect other agents to play as they have
played in the past. This focus on past actions
can thus rationalize adaptive expectations, and
therefore inertia in inflation, as a self-fulfilling
prophecy. Evidence on US post-war inflation
is consistent with the formulation of Driscoll
and Holden.
As this brief literature survey on the
aggregate supply puzzle has documented,
behavioural assumptions have provided new
and interesting approaches to an important
and difficult problem within macro-
economics. Yet it is fair to say that one has not
yet come further when it comes to arriving at
a broadly accepted framework. As behavioural
assumptions open up new possibilities, it
becomes even more important to be able to
distinguish empirically between them, and so
far, little work has been done it that direction.
Concluding remarks
In mainstream economics, the economic man
hypothesis has been maintained in part to
avoid the mushrooming of explanations and
theories based on ad hoc behavioural
assumptions. However, there is now sufficient
evidence on important aspects of human
behaviour that a number of deviations from
the economic man hypothesis should no
longer be viewed as ad hoc. In several parts of
macroeconomics, theories based on broader
behavioural assumptions seem highly
promising. Yet it remains to be seen how far-
reaching the changes will be.
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